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UPDATE ON CUBA’S NON-SUGAR AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Mario A. González Corzo
In its recent efforts to transform (or “update”) its
economic model, Cuba has understandably focused
on its agricultural sector. Even though it only ac-
counts for approximately 5% of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), agriculture represents a relatively large
share of the Cuban economy (some 20%) due to its
direct linkages with other sectors and multiplier ef-
fect (Nova González, 2006). Despite the expansion
of tourism and services, Cuba still remains an agri-
cultural country, and agriculture touches every aspect
of the country’s economic and social life.
Since Raúl Castro’s official ascent to power on Feb-
ruary 24, 2008, a series of policy measures have been
implemented to prioritize and reactivate this vital
sector of the Cuban economy. The most significant
include: the approval of Decree-Law No. 259 of
2008, which facilitates the transfers of idle State-
owned lands to private producers and agricultural co-
operatives; the transfer of some of the functions per-
formed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI)
to the Ministry of Interior Trade (MINCIN); the
creation of a limited number of State-operated estab-
lishments to sell basic agricultural inputs (e.g., seeds,
fertilizer, work gloves, machetes, axes, etc.) to small
agricultural producers; experiments with “suburban
agriculture” to connect local producers and consum-
ers and reduce fuel, transportation and storage costs;
and increases in the prices paid by Acopio, the State-
run agricultural procurement agency, to private
farmers and cooperatives producing milk, beans, rice,
and other products.
This paper explores the principal transformations
that have occurred in Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural
sector in recent years. The first section examines the
sector’s evolution during the “pre-reform period” of
2005–2008, focusing on total output and yields.
This is followed by an overview of recent policy mea-
sures (or “reforms”) implemented by Cuba to reacti-
vate its agricultural sector and reduce its external de-
pendency on imported food and food products. The
last section analyzes the recent performance (2008 to
the present) of Cuba’s non-agricultural sector and
the impact of the transformations that have taken
place so far.
PERFORMANCE DURING THE 
“PRE-REFORM” PERIOD (2005 -2008)
In recent years, Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector
has been characterized by declining output levels,
falling yields and growing dependency on food im-
ports (particularly from the United States). As Table
1 shows, between 2005 and 2008, physical output
declined in nine out of eleven categories. For in-
stance, the production of roots and tubers, tobacco,
citrus fruits, and cocoa suffered double digit declines
during this period. This was the combined result of
natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and severe
drought), low factor productivity, difficulties with
the acquisition of essential inputs (e.g., fertilizers),
insufficient equipment and machinery, the lack of
price incentives (to stimulate production), etc.
As Table 2 illustrates, yields (or output per cultivated
area) also declined significantly during the 2005–
2008 period. The crops with the most notable de-
clines were: cocoa, tobacco, citrus fruits, beans, le-
gumes, and greens. While natural disasters were a
major contributor, lower yields were also the result of
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insufficient capital and labor inputs and reduced fac-
tor productivity.
In addition to declining output levels and falling
yields in non-sugar agriculture, the Cuban economy
has experienced an increased dependency on food
imports. Since the approval of the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) in 2000,
the United States has emerged as Cuba’s principal
supplier of imported food and agricultural products.
In 2001, the total value of U.S food and agricultural
exports to Cuba reached a meager $4.3 million
(U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council [US-
CTEC], 2010); this figure increased to approximate-
ly $528.5 million by the end of 2009 (USCTEC,
2010), and the cumulative value of TSRA-authorized
U.S. exports to Cuba from 2001 to July 2010
reached an estimated $3.4 billion (USCTEC, 2010).
Despite these impressive figures, U.S. food and agri-
cultural exports to Cuba have declined substantially
since 2008. Between January 2010 and July 2010,
for instance, U.S. food and agricultural exports to
Cuba were $182.3 million, compared to $278.2 mil-
lion during a like period in 2009, representing a de-
crease of 35% (USCTEC, 2010). The decline of
U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba can be at-
tributed to three factors. First, Cuba has experienced
a liquidity and macroeconomic crisis since 2008,
which has limited its access to foreign exchange and
international sources of (credit) financing, thereby
reducing its ability to purchase food and agricultural
products from the U.S., which must be paid in cash.
Table 1. Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural Output (In Tons)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Change
2005 -2008 % Change
Viandas 2,575,300 2,202,000 2,369,500 2,150,700 -424,600 -16.5%
Roots and tubers 1,801,800 1,330,200 1,378,600 1,392,500 -409,300 -22.7%
Plantains 773,500 871,800 990,900 758,200 -15,300 -2.0%
Greens 3,203,500 2,672,100 2,603,000 2,439,300 -764,200 -23.9%
Cereals 730,100 739,600 808,400 761,700 31,600 4.3%
Rice 367,600 434,200 439,600 436,000 68,400 18.6%
Corn 362,500 305,400 368,800 325,700 -36,800 -10.2%
Legumes 106,200 70,600 97,200 97,200 -9,000 -8.5%
Beans 106,200 70,600 97,200 97,200 -9,000 -8.5%
Tobacco 26,000 29,700 25,600 21,500 -4,500 -17.3%
Citrus Fruits 554,600 373,000 469,000 391,800 -162,800 -29.4%
Other Fruits 819,000 746,500 783,800 738,500 -80,500 -9.8%
Cocoa 2,067 2,120 1,379 1,100 -967 -46.8%
Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.
Table 2. Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural, Yields, Selected Crops (Tons per Hectare)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Change
2005 - 2008 % Change
Viandas 7.42 7.78 7.73 7.69 0.27 3.6%
Roots and tubers 7.16 7.27 6.76 7.10 -0.06 -0.8%
Plantains 8.11 8.71 9.67 9.07 0.96 11.8%
Greens 10.28 11.53 11.28 9.42 -0.86 -8.4%
Cereals 2.58 2.79 2.91 2.68 0.09 3.6%
Rice 2.89 3.04 3.23 2.80 -0.09 -3.0%
Corn 2.33 2.50 2.61 2.52 0.19 8.2%
Legumes 1.12 0.92 1.16 1.02 -0.10 -8.9%
Beans 1.12 0.92 1.16 1.02 -0.10 -8.9%
Tobacco 1.28 1.10 1.12 0.93 -0.35 -27.1%
Citrus fruits 9.86 6.73 9.60 8.59 -1.27 -12.9%
Other Fruits 10.11 9.71 7.84 8.89 -1.22 -12.1%
Cocoa 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.29 -0.22 -43.2%
Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.
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Second, Cuba’s growing ties (and interdependence)
with its two principal trading partners, Venezuela
and China, have reduced its need to purchase prod-
ucts from the U.S. Third, growing importance of di-
rect bilateral, and in many cases barter-based, trade
agreements between Cuba and countries that offer
the island favorable terms and conditions, often mo-
tivated by strategic and political considerations (e.g.,
China, Iran and Spain) have provided Cuba with al-
ternative sources of imports.
RECENT POLICY MEASURES
Falling agricultural output and yields, low labor pro-
ductivity, high levels of waste and inefficiency, the
rising costs of food imports, and the deterioration of
the trade balance, have placed food production at the
forefront of the economic challenges confronting
Cuba at the present time (Hagelberg, 2010). Accord-
ing to official statistics, Cuba spent $1.494 billion on
imported food and agricultural products in 2009,
representing 17% of the country’s total merchandise
imports for that year (Anuario Estadístico de Cuba
[AEC], 2009).
As it experienced the worst economic crisis since the
collapse of the Eastern European Socialist Bloc and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s, and confronted with a more favorable inter-
national environment, mainly as the result of its close
economic ties with Venezuela, China, and Canada,
and its extended diplomatic relations with virtually
every country in the Western Hemisphere and other
regions of the world, Cuba has implemented a series
of policy measures to transform its agricultural sec-
tor. 
One of the first steps taken in this direction consisted
of paying higher prices to producers of certain agri-
cultural products. This process was initiated in 2007,
when the State procurement agency, Acopio, in-
creased the prices it paid milk producers as well as the
percentage paid in convertible pesos (CUC) per liter
produced and delivered. The resulting increase in
producers’ incomes resulting from this measure in-
creased producers’ capacity to obtain essential inputs
to further increase production (Nova, 2010). These
price increases allowed Acopio to recover a part of this
production, which previously had other destinations,
and producers have been encouraged to sell their
product to Acopio. This measure constitutes a direct
stimulus to producers, and incentivizes them to indi-
rectly contribute to certain savings in fuel and loss re-
ductions because of timely deliveries made to Acopio.
This procedure has been implemented in 89 munici-
palities, of which 66 are fully self-sufficient. Howev-
er, it has resulted in certain unintended consequenc-
es, which have contributed to reductions in deliveries
to industry, resulting in the under-utilization of the
country’s industrial capacity (Nova, 2010). Acopio
also increased the prices it pays to meat and poultry
producers. Payments in convertible pesos (CUC) to
meat and poultry producers have increased their pur-
chasing power, allowing many of them to obtain es-
sential agricultural inputs in recently-created hard
currency stores for this purpose (there are stores in 70
of the 168 existing municipalities).Unfortunately,
these stores tend to offer a limited variety of inputs of
about 64 products, supply has been unpredictable
and unreliable, and prices tend to be relatively high.
The second significant policy measure implemented
to transform Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector
was the transfer of idle State-owned land to coopera-
tives and individual producers pursuant to Decree-
Law No. 259 of July 2008. The implementation of
this measure is somewhat paradoxical since there is a
significant amount of idle lands (1,758, 962 hect-
ares), valuable human capital, a significant number
of research centers and experimental stations, with
proven results, and available technology, but since
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegra-
tion of the Socialist Camp in the early 1990s, the
Cuban economy has been forced to import signifi-
cant volumes of food, many of which can be pro-
duced domestically under more favorable conditions. 
Decree-Law No. 259 clarifies important aspects of
Cuba’s most recent “agrarian reform,” the conditions
of usufruct under which idle State-owned lands will
be transferred to cooperatives and individual produc-
ers, the terms of economic ownership related to this
property form, and its relation to legal ownership
(Nova, 2010). It also helps to clarify important as-
pects, which until recently remained unclear or un-
defined, such as the period of time for which the usu-
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fruct is established, which helps define its economic
ownership and legal ownership, and the collection of
taxes and rents by the State.
In addition, Decree-Law No. 259 incorporates some
elements that were not taken into consideration in
previous agricultural reform measures, such as the
duration of transfers to natural persons (10 years, re-
newable leases, regardless of the type of crop harvest-
ed), and the transfers of land to legal entities such as
cooperatives (Nova, 2010). One interesting feature
that distinguishes Decree-Law No. 259 from previ-
ous legislation is that the terms of the usufruct, or
lease agreements, are standardized for specific periods
regardless of the types of crops produced, the modes
of production used to generate this output, and
whether or not the crops are considered short-cycle
or long-cycle, and the type of livestock raised by pro-
ducers (Nova, 2010).
The degree of investment intensity related to agricul-
tural production varies according to the type of crop
produced, or the type of livestock raised. Some prod-
ucts and forms of livestock are more labor and capital
intensive than others, and due to their seasonal na-
ture require different quantities of labor and physical
and financial capital. Pursuant to Article 15 (of De-
cree-Law No. 259), once finalized, the terms of the
usufruct allow producers to receive payment or com-
pensation from the State for bienhechurías, or infra-
structure or physical improvements to the land and
facilities used for production, with the exception of
housing built by individual producers or coopera-
tives. This constraint or limit provides a distorted in-
centive to make the minimum investment required,
prevents the agricultural producers permanently set-
tling in their newly acquired lands (leased from the
State), and explains why most of them despite the
positive advances made by Decree-Law No. 259,
consider themselves as transient (non-permanent)
producers. In reality, as Nova (2009, 2010) indicates,
the successful transformation of Cuba’s agricultural
sector requires the recampesinización, or the re-popu-
lation of the countryside; without significant and
long-lasting increases in the quantity of farmers,
technicians, and administrative and managerial per-
sonnel dedicated to agriculture, there is no guarantee
and stability of a sustainable agricultural production.
Cuba’s newly decentralized agricultural model must
recognize that agricultural producers require certain
facilities to store and preserve the essential inputs, an-
imals, seeds, supplies, and equipment, among others.
To stimulate the migration of labor from other areas
of the economy into agriculture, policies that provide
economic incentives for investment in physical infra-
structure and promote long-term commitments to
agriculture are being contemplated. To ensure the
success of this decentralized model of agricultural
production, where regional and local producers are
expected to develop strong linkages with the land in
which they work, and consumers and suppliers in
their respective “markets,” producers and administra-
tive and managerial personnel need to live near or on
the locations where production takes, a sense of per-
manence and consistency must be encouraged and
developed, and the linkages between producers and
the lands in which production takes place must be
strengthened over time (Nova, 2010). 
By the end of 2009, some 920,000 hectares of idle
State-owned lands had been transferred to more than
100,000 applicants, representing 52% of the total
(Nova, 2010). Until January 2010, there had been
121,711 applications, of which 98% are natural per-
sons, of which approximately 79% were previously
landless (Nova, 2010). At present, it is estimated that
35% of the land delivered has been planted or culti-
vated (Nova, 2010). Considering the original condi-
tions of the majority of this land, and the wide range
of challenges, constraints, and difficulties that non-
State agricultural producers still face, this is indeed a
remarkable accomplishment. 
Yet, despite the notable increases in the number of
applications from both cooperatives and individual
producers, the transfer of idle State-owned lands to
non-State producers has been characterized by a se-
ries of bureaucratic hurdles and impediments, which
still present serious difficulties. According to the pro-
visions of Decree-Law 282, nine documents are re-
quired for processing of application for the transfer
of land in usufruct (Nova, 2010). To file a complaint
or appeal, applicants are required to complete and
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submit thirteen documents, and from the time the
applicant files the application for the transfer of land
with the municipal director of the Centro Nacional
del Control de la Tierra (National Center for Land
Control), the office has thirty days to review the ap-
plication, and draft or prepare the required docu-
mentation, and up to sixty days to conduct the neces-
sary surveys and medical examinations of the
livestock to be transferred from State ownership to
the non-State sector (Nova, 2010).Once the neces-
sary documents are drawn, the municipal director of
the National Center for Land Control presents them
to the municipal delegate of agriculture in the term
of three days, and the latter has thirty days to review
and approve the requested transfer in usufruct (Nova,
2010). 
Theoretically, it can take at least sixty-three days,
from the beginning of the application to lease idle
lands or livestock from the State for a predetermined
period of time, under the conditions previously de-
scribed, until the formal documents are approved
and issued, assuming that process transpires normally
and does not require additional field surveys or mea-
surements, and other bureaucratic steps or proce-
dures. In such cases, the time needed to clear existing
bureaucratic hurdles and effectively transfer the land
or livestock from the State to the cooperative or pri-
vate sectors can theoretically taken ninety-three (93)
days or even longer.
Another important measure in Cuba’s road towards a
more flexible and decentralized agricultural model
was the transfer of the collection activities, assigned
to the State-owned procurement agency, Acopio, to
the Ministry of Domestic Trade (Ministerio del Co-
mercio Interior, MINCIN). For many experts in Cu-
ban agriculture, this is considered as a road already
traveled. In 1976, procurement was transferred from
the Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de la Agricul-
tura, MINAGRI), but then returned to it after the
“Rectification Process” (RP) in 1986. Nova (2010)
and others consider that transferring Acopio’s func-
tions to the MINAGRI would be a more logical and
appropriate step to improve the operational and ad-
ministrative efficiency of Cuba’s cumbersome system
of agricultural procurement.
At present, Cuba’s agricultural procurement and
marketing system is hindered by a highly regulated
market, the distortions related to monetary dualism,
and insufficient output, particularly by the coopera-
tive sector (which includes the Unidades Básicas de
Producción Cooperativa, UBPCs, and the Cooperati-
vas de Producción Agropecuaria, CPAs). Despite re-
cent efforts, the marketing function, which includes
the distribution and exchange of agricultural prod-
ucts, is characterized by delayed payments, insuffi-
cient collection capacity on the part of Acopio, and
the lack of material incentives and credit financing to
stimulate and incentivize production (Nova, 2010). 
Another key measure in the transformation of Cuba’s
non-sugar agricultural sector has been the decentral-
ization and restructuring of the functions of the min-
istries responsible for the administration, implemen-
tation, and oversight of the country’s agricultural
policies. The municipality as an increasingly autono-
mous economic unit is as the center of this new strat-
egy. The newly-considered model of decentralized
decision making identifies the municipality as the
principal actor responsible for making rational eco-
nomic decisions and implementing the required
strategies within its territorial boundaries. At present,
each municipality has established a Municipal Dele-
gation of Agriculture (169 in total), which is primar-
ily responsible for managing the transfers of idle
State-owned lands and State-owned livestock to the
non-State sector, to promote and stimulate the devel-
opment of three “core” modalities of production: (1)
urban agriculture, (2) suburban agriculture, which
covers a span of about 10 km from the periphery of
cities and urban centers, and (3) and productive or
conventional poles (Nova, 2010).
During the testing phase of this model in 2010, the
MINAGRI selected 16 municipalities plus the spe-
cial municipality of Isla de la Juventud, a total of 17,
to carry across the combination of these three scenar-
ios. Participation was extended to all the entities that
produce food in the municipality, whether or not un-
der the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture
(UBPCs, CCS, CPAs, State-owned farms, etc.) (No-
va, 2010). In addition, the Ministry of the Economy
and Planning (MEP) has also selected five municipal-
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ities that are supporting financially and decentralized
forms of economic management, for investigation on
solutions on the substitution of imports, export gen-
erated funds, on the food and employment problem
(Nova, 2010) The MEP is also implementing a series
of internal reforms to simply the State apparatus and
structures that deal or are in some ways related with
the production, distribution, and consumption of ag-
ricultural products. The first step in this direction
was the unification of the Ministry of the Food In-
dustry (Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia,
MINAL) with the former Ministry of Fisheries.
There have also been discussions about the possible
combination or fusion of the Ministry of Agriculture
and the Ministry of Sugar (Ministerio de la Industria
Azucarera, MINAZ), to create a single Ministry of
Food, which is likely to include diverse areas such as
agriculture (sugar and non-sugar, food processing
and industrial production, and fisheries) (Nova,
2010).
The approval of Agreement 6823 on June 24, 2010
represented another important step in the transfor-
mation of Cuba’s non-sugar agriculture sector. This
policy measure authorizes the commercialization (or
trade) of agricultural products in roadside kiosks (or
“points of sale”) operated by agricultural cooperatives
or state enterprises. Producers or their representatives
are authorized to sell their excess output, after their
quotas to the state have been delivered (or met)
(“Acuerdo 6853,” 2010). Agricultural producers or
their representatives are required to pay taxes and/or
fees for the use of these kiosks (or “points of sale”) as
stipulated by Resolution 206 issued by the Ministry
of Prices and Finance. According to Resolution 206,
sellers in the kiosks (or “points of sale”) established
by Agreement 6853 are required to pay a sales tax of
5%, based on their daily gross sales, plus a fee of 2%
of the value of their reported gross sales for the use of
the kiosks and related facilities, and self-employed
workers (who work on these kiosks) are required to
make social security contributions. 
The approval of Agreement 6853 (2010) represents a
step in the right direction. However, certain provi-
sions limit its potential. First, the entities or adminis-
trative units that administer the kiosks (or “points of
sale”) are a State-owned entity, which implies that
the State will continue to play a significant role in the
administration of the important sales venues. Sec-
ond, producers that use these venues to commercial-
ize their agricultural products must first fulfill their
delivery quotas to the State at prices and amounts es-
tablished by the latter. These conditions limit the au-
tonomy of participants in the kiosks (or “points of
sale”) in terms of determining output prices and
quantity, and are likely to contribute to imbalances
between supply and demand.
Finally, in June 2011 Cuba announced the expan-
sion of bank credit to small-scale agricultural produc-
ers and cooperatives. According to an article pub-
lished in Juventud Rebelde, the Banco de Crédito y
Comercio (BANDEC) had approved credit financing
for an estimated 13,000 farmers (Tamayo, 2011).
Most of these loans are to be used to finance working
capital, facilitate the cultivation of short-term crops
and long-term crops (like sugar), purchase livestock,
and finance the acquisition of physical assets (exclud-
ing those related to the removal of “marabú”)
(Tamayo, 2011). Borrowers can use expected sales
(or revenues), income generated through the com-
mercialization of agricultural products, and any other
source of income (remittances?) as collateral for these
loans (Tamayo, 2011).
The extension of bank credit (microloans) to agricul-
tural producers also represents a step in the right di-
rection. However, it is too early to quantify the im-
pact of these loans on output and yields.
RECENT PERFORMANCE (2008–2010)
As Table 3 shows, Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sec-
tor experienced mixed results during the 2008–2010
period. The production of viandas, a food staple of
vital importance in the traditional Cuban diet, grew
4.6%; roots and tubers increased 8.8%; cereals rose
2.2%; other fruits increased 3.2%, and cocoa pro-
duction grew 55.4%. By contrast, greens fell 12.2%;
legumes and beans declined 17.3%; tobacco produc-
tion fell 4.7%; and citrus fruits decreased 12%.
While a portion of these declines can be attributed to
structural problems and deficiencies, such as the lack
of economic (or price) incentives, insufficient inputs,
and excessive bureaucratic constraints, Cuba’s agri-
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cultural output has been severely affected by unfavor-
able climatic conditions such as severe droughts in
and powerful tropical storms and hurricanes. In
2008, the island was impacted by three hurricanes,
which affected its principal agricultural provinces,
Villa Clara, Matanzas and Camagüey, and caused an
estimated $10 billion in damages (equivalent to 20%
of GDP).In response to impact of these hurricanes
on non-sugar agricultural production, in October
2008 the Cuban government implemented a number
of measures to restrict the supply of agricultural
products and prevent speculators and price gougers
from taking advantage of the severe agricultural loss-
es caused by a series of natural disasters. The mecha-
nisms employed were price controls, output restric-
tions, and strict government supervision of
transactions in the “free farmers’ markets,” State-
controlled agricultural markets, and the retail outlets
incorporated into the rationing system. 
Despite its good intentions, these measures resulted
in negative externalities and contributed to short-
lived price pressures in the black market for scarce ag-
ricultural products. In some parts of the island, agri-
cultural markets suffered from insufficient supplies,
particularly those in which prices and output were
primarily determined by the forces of supply and de-
mand, and the price controls placed affected produc-
ers in the difficult predicament of not being able to
cover their losses, which eventually were transferred
to the State via Acopio’s supply chain and distribution
network. 
To counter speculative forces, the State imposed a se-
ries of requirements that restricted output and pre-
vented some producers from reaching the multiple
distribution channels through which they could offer
their agricultural goods, resulting in a notable de-
crease in supply by the end of 2008. Ironically, the
government’s swift response to the devastation suf-
fered by Cuba’s agricultural sector in the aftermath
of the 2008 hurricane season, in some instances, re-
sulted in the opposite effect: prices rose as output de-
clined, disproportionally hurting the economically
vulnerable segments of the population that the gov-
ernment was trying to protect.
The resulting supply shock had far reaching conse-
quences. By the end of 2008 and the earlier part of
2009, a large number of neighborhood agricultural
stalls, which were typically scattered through Cuba’s
169 municipalities and served as the main outlet to
purchase domestic agricultural products for the ma-
jority of the country’s population, closed down due
to insufficient supply and agricultural fairs were dis-
continued (Nova, 2010). In the case of the neighbor-
hood agricultural stalls, it is worth noting that these
low-scale outlets are mainly supplied by the coopera-
tive sector, offer a greater consistency in supply, bet-
ter product selection and quality, and competitive
prices when compared with their State-run counter-
parts and the agricultural products offered through
Cuba’s vast network of “hard currency stores” (Nova,
2010). These establishments offer an additional con-
venience: they are the are conveniently located close
Table 3. Cuba: Non-Sugar Agricultural Output, Selected Crops, 2008–2010 Tons
2008 2009 2010
Change
2008 - 2010 % Change
Viandas 2,150,700 2,236,000 2,250,000 99,300 4.62%
Roots and tubers 1,392,500 1,565,600 1,515,000 122,500 8.80%
Plantains 758,200 670,400 735,000 -23,200 -3.06%
Greens 2,439,300 2,548,800 2,141,000 -298,300 -12.23%
Cereals 761,700 868,400 778,900 17,200 2.26%
Rice 436,000 563,600 454,400 18,400 4.22%
Corn 325,700 304,800 324,500 -1,200 -0.37%
Legumes 97,200 110,800 80,400 -16,800 -17.28%
Beans 97,200 110,800 80,400 -16,800 -17.28%
Tobacco 21,500 25,200 20,500 -1,000 -4.65%
Citrus Fruits 391,800 418,000 345,000 -46,800 -11.94%
Other Fruits 738,500 748,000 762,000 23,500 3.18%
Cocoa 1,100 1,387 1,709 609 55.36%
Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.
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to consumers’ homes, which represents a tremendous
advantage for the majority of households in a coun-
try where the majority of the population (close to
78%) lives in urban centers, and convenient means
of transportation are relative scarce and terribly ex-
pensive.
During the 2008–2010 period agricultural yields ex-
hibited mostly negative tendencies, with the excep-
tion of tobacco (8.5%), and cocoa (11.1%). This was
mainly attributed to the scarcity of agricultural in-
puts (e.g., pesticides, fertilizer, and fuel), the impact
of adverse climatic conditions, and shortages of labor
inputs (Table 4).
One contradictory aspect of Cuban agriculture is
that despite recent policy measures to increase the
role of the Non-State sector, the State continues to
play a key role in this vital area of the Cuban econo-
my. Output by the Non-State sector is greater than
80% in eight out of the nine agricultural product cat-
egories reported by the National Statistical Office
(ONE) in 2010. This apparent contradiction stems
from the fact that Cuban agricultural figures consider
output and land held by the UBPCs (Units of Basic
Cooperative Production) as part of the Non-State
sector despite the limitations (administrative, mana-
gerial, and operational) confronted by these entities. 
TOWARDS MARKET SOCIALISM?
The experiences of the countries that have transi-
tioned from the classical socialist model to market so-
cialism suggest that this process is driven in large part
by the need to increase labor productivity and im-
prove economic efficiency. As the transition from the
classical (socialist) model to the reformed (or market
based) socialist model takes place, salaries and com-
pensation are transformed to improve the productivi-
ty of labor, and increase economic efficiency and the
profitability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) un-
dergoing “enterprise perfectioning.” Despite the em-
phasis given to profitability, efficiency, and produc-
tivity, the desired results or outcomes are hardly ever
achieved in the majority of SOEs, because in practice
profitability (or the lack thereof), efficiency, and pro-
ductivity are rarely considered determining factors of
the future viability of these enterprises, given the
continuity of some of the practices inherited from
the classical system, which “soften” their budget con-
straint.1
The private sector plays greater role in the economy,
and part of the economically active population em-
ployed by the State sector at the onset of the reform
process is allowed (and sometimes left with no alter-
native but) to “migrate” to the emerging private sec-
tor. Output in the Non-State sector, as a share of to-
Table 4. Cuba: Non- Sugar Agricultural, Yields, Selected Crops (tons per hectare)
2008 2009 2010
Change 
2008 - 2010 % Change
Viandas 7.69 6.34 6.20 -1.49 -19.4%
Roots and tubers 7.10 6.36 6.21 -0.89 -12.5%
Plantains 9.07 6.30 6.17 -2.90 -32.0%
Greens 9.42 9.15 9.05 -0.37 -3.9%
Cereals 2.68 2.07 1.94 -0.73 -27.5%
Rice 2.80 2.61 2.58 -0.23 -8.1%
Corn 2.52 1.49 1.44 -1.08 -42.8%
Legumes 1.02 0.74 0.71 -0.31 -30.1%
Beans 1.02 0.74 0.71 -0.31 -30.1%
Tobacco 0.93 1.01 1.01 0.08 8.5%
Citrus Fruits 8.59 8.72 8.00 -0.59 -6.9%
Other Fruits 8.89 8.16 7.86 -1.03 -11.5%
Cocoa 0.29 0.27 0.32 0.03 11.1%
Source: Anuario Estadístico de Cuba (AEC) 2010, and author’s calculations.
1. According to Kornai (1992), some of the commonly-used practices that “soften” the budget constraint of SOEs undergoing “enter-
prise perfectioning” under market socialism include: (1) indirect subsidies, (2) tax reductions, (3) State-provided credit and financing,
and (4) favorable price policies.
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tal output, increases during the period of transition,
as it absorbs some of the (excess) inputs (i.e., labor
and capital) released by the State sector. Higher earn-
ings and increased managerial autonomy function as
“pull factors” in the Non-State sector, providing the
necessary economic incentives for part of the eco-
nomically active population to exit the State sector.
The State sector’s share of total output and employ-
ment declines, as more workers “migrate” to the
emerging private sector in search of higher wages and
compensation.
Despite the Non-State sector’s growing role in the
economy, based on its share of total output and land
under cultivation reported by the National Statistics
Office (ONE), it remains under the “shadow” of the
State, resulting in one of the major contradictions of
Cuba’s form of market socialism. While the prices of
some agricultural products have been partially liber-
alized, which as conventional economic theory sug-
gests has incentivized production and within the con-
straints under which the Cuban economy currently
operates contributed to an improved (i.e., more effi-
cient) allocation of scarce resources in some areas of
the economy, price controls, subsidies, and other
forms of non-market allocation in other areas still
contribute to shortages, the production of goods and
services of inferior quality, inefficient resource alloca-
tion, waste, mismanagement, and other distortions
commonly associated with centralized planning. 
Notwithstanding the partial recovery of some seg-
ments of Cuba’s non-sugar agricultural sector, out-
put and yields are still significantly depressed when
compared to the performance levels reported in 1989
(the year that marked the beginning of the economic
crisis en the nineties and the “Special Period”). Fig-
ures pertaining to agricultural yields (i.e., output per
hectare) demonstrate a decreasing tendency, as a re-
sult of endogenous and exogenous factors related to
agricultural production.
In terms of the policy measures recently implement-
ed to non-cane agricultural production in Cuba, it is
worth noting that even though there have been some
positive results since 2008, there is still much more
to do to stimulate agricultural production in Cuba.
The mere delivery of idle State-owned land in usu-
fruct to private producers and agricultural coopera-
tives is unlikely to result in significant and sustain-
able increases in production in the long-run. As of
the end of 2009, Cuban officials reported that an es-
timated 920,000 hectares (of idle State-owned land)
had been transferred to more than 100,000 recipients
(or beneficiaries) (Hagelberg, 2010). While this mea-
sure undoubtedly represents a movement from a
State-centric model of agricultural production to a
more decentralized form of land tenure, similar to
the one implemented in Vietnam at the onset of its
Doi Moi reform process in 1986, the lukewarm re-
sponse considering the potential number of persons
who might have applied for the permits to farm these
lands under less uncertain circumstances suggests the
need to further expand this measure.
Hagelberg (2010) correctly states that “the authori-
ties were admittedly overwhelmed by the flood of re-
quests for plots triggered by Decree-Law No. 259”
and cites Cuban media reports that indicate that the
number of applicants increased substantially from
2008 to 2009. While those figures are impressive,
given the limitations and constrains of Decree-Law
No. 259, it seems reasonable to believe that they are
probably far below their true potential. This “true
hidden potential”—referring to the number of per-
sons who would probably apply for permits to farm
on State-owned lands under different
circumstances—is probably discouraged by the diffi-
culties faced by recent applicants such as the lack of
necessary tools and inputs, particularly fuel, pesti-
cide, and fertilizers, the inhospitable conditions of
the lands to be cultivated, and the lack of adequate
infrastructure, including housing, barns, stables, stor-
age facilities, etc. 
To encourage the revival of Cuba’s non-cane agricul-
ture, it is fundamental to experiment with new forms
of property, including individual or private property
with clearly-defined transfer and inheritance rights,
and the capacity to earn, payout, and even repatriate
after-tax profits. This does not imply the complete
abolition of existing forms of collective property such
as agricultural cooperatives (e.g., Cooperativas de Pro-
duction Agrícola—CPAs, Cooperativas de Créditos y
Servicios—CCS, etc); but rather that complementary
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relations that may exist between these forms of prop-
erties and private property. In the process of trans-
forming the Cuban economic model alternative
property forms property must play a fundamental
role to ensure the success of economic policies and
strategies designed with this purpose in mind; the ex-
periences of China and Vietnam in agriculture dem-
onstrate that these changes or transformations must
be simultaneously incremental and tangible in order
to reach their goals.
Recent efforts to advance a decentralized model of
suburban agriculture in Cuba represent a gradual,
but positive, step towards market socialism. In con-
trast to the more centralized model of urban agricul-
ture implemented as a response to the “food crisis” of
the early 1990s, the principal operational structures
in the model of suburban agriculture currently being
encouraged by the Cuban government are small-
scale, eco-friendly, privately-owned farms or fincas
located a few kilometers from urban centers (Hagel-
berg, 2010). Cuba’s suburban agriculture strategy
aims to reduce the distance between producers and
consumers, curtail fuel consumption, and reduce Cu-
ba’s dependence on imported food and fuel (Hagel-
berg, 2010). While the emphasis of this alternative
mode of production is on energy conservation and
sustainability, the development of local and regional
market-based coordination mechanisms can play an
important role in the success of this strategy. 
The relatively low agricultural yields in Cuba’s agri-
cultural sector point out to the need to improve total
factor productivity. To achieve this goal structural
measures that allow greater integration of technology
and foreign capital should be considered, along with
labor market reforms that improve the relationship
between results and earnings, and policy transforma-
tions to allow greater participation by the Non-State
sector, especially private farmers, improved access to
credit financing and diversified sources of capital, in-
cluding private investment, and greater availability of
essential agricultural inputs and supplies such as fer-
tilizer, fuel, irrigation equipment, machinery, seeds,
etc.
Given its long and successful participation in impor-
tant clusters of non-cane agriculture in Cuba, the pri-
vate sector should be allowed to play a larger role in
the recovery and revival of this important sector of
the economy. However, the expansion of the private
sector should be conducted in gradual and regulated
manner, particularly with regards to labor practices,
the accumulation and transfer of assets, and health
and safety standards. In this context, a strong but not
antagonistic State, with the capacity to adapt and in-
novate, particularly on the regulatory front, but not
completely malleable by the brutal forces of market
capitalism, could play a vital role to ensure and pro-
mote agricultural self-sufficiency and national food
security in Cuba. 
REFERENCES
Anuario Estadístico de Cuba, 2010. Oficina Nacional
de Estadísticas (ONE). 2011. La Habana, Cuba.
Hagelberg, G.H. 2010. “If it were just the “marabú”
Cuba in Transition—Volume 20. Washington:
Association for the Study of the Cuban Econo-
my. 
Kornai, Janos. 1992. The Socialist System:The Politi-
cal Economy of Communism. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Nova González, A. (2006). La agricultura en Cuba:
Evolución y trayectoria (1959–2005). La Habana,
Cuba: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.
Nova González, A. (2010). “Agricultura.” In Miradas
a la economía cubana: II (pp. 43–71). La Ha-
bana, Cuba: Editorial Caminos.
Tamayo, R. (2011). “La tierra tiene crédito.” Juven-
tud Rebelde (July 10). Retrieved on July 10, 2011
from http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2011
-07–10/la-tierra-tiene-credito/ 
